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may seem anomalous; if they were reclassified as subordinate real rights – involving,
as servitudes do, a correlative position – they would become so open.27
D L Carey Miller
University of Aberdeen
EdinLR Vol 12 pp 455-459
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Accessory Rights in Servitudes
When, in 1998, neighbours in Shetland quarrelled over parking rights, they cannot
have imagined that the dispute would finish up, almost a decade later, in the House
of Lords. In one sense, therefore, it is correct to characterise Moncrieff v Jamieson1
as an “unfortunate case” with a “prolonged and highly regrettable history”.2 But the
case is also an example of “the life blood of the common law”3 because it raises, and
largely settles, the question of how accessory rights arise in the context of servitudes.
Along the way, important things are said about the fixed list of servitudes, the rule that
a servitude must not be repugnant with ownership, and the long-disputed question as
to whether a servitude of parking is recognised in Scots (and English) law. Only the
issue of accessory rights can be considered in this short note.4
Moncrieff v Jamieson concerned a house owned by the pursuers which adjoined
the sea and could be reached from the landward side only by a private road running
through the third defenders’ land.5 At one time both properties had belonged to the
same person, but the pursuers’ property was broken off by a disposition in 1973. This
conferred “a right of access from the branch public road through Sandsound”. Due
to a steep fall in the land, it was not possible to take a car from the private road, over
which access rights had been conferred, on to the pursuers’ property, and the road
was too narrow for a vehicle to turn. Accordingly, the pursuers’ long-standing practice
was to use part of the defenders’ land for turning and parking. It was the defenders’
challenge to that practice which sparked the current litigation, in which the pursuers
sought declarator and interdict.
27 Credit for this observation – not made in the context of Peart – is due to Professor George Gretton.
1 [2007] UKHL 42, 2008 SC (HL) 1.
2 Paras 19, 42 per Lord Hope.
3 Para 66 per Lord Rodger.
4 For commentary on the case, see: D Bartos, “Advance to free parking? –Moncrieff v Jamieson” (2007) 75
SLG 203; R Paisley, “Clear view” (2007) 52 JLSS Dec/50; K G C Reid and G L Gretton, Conveyancing
2007 (2008) 106; A Goymour, “Easements, servitudes and the right to park” (2008) 67 CLJ 20; MHanley,
“ Moncrieff v Jamieson: easements, exclusionary use and elusive principles” [2008] Conv 144.
5 However, since the case was before the sheriff a new public road has in fact been built to within metres
of the pursuers’ property, with a turning circle at its terminus.
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In the end, the dispute between the parties was a narrow one. It was accepted
that the pursuers had a servitude of way over the road. It was further accepted that
such a servitude was capable of carrying, by implication, certain accessory rights, and
that those rights included, in the present case, a right to use the defenders’ land to
load and unload and to turn. But what was disputed was whether there was also an
accessory right to park. At first instance, the sheriff held that there was such a right
and granted decree in favour of the pursuers,6 and in 2005 this was affirmed by an
Extra Division of the Court of Session (Lord Hamilton dissenting).7 Now the House
of Lords has come to the same conclusion, although with more hesitation than might
be indicated by a decision which, in the end, was reached unanimously.8
A. DOCTRINAL ATTRIBUTION
In deciding whether parking was included within the bare grant of a “right of access”,
the House of Lords had first to determine the basis on which accessory rights can be
implied – a subject on which previous authority was sparse and inconclusive.9 With
the exception of Lord Rodger, who favoured a more stringent test,10 their Lordships
were in agreement that an accessory right would be recognised if it was reasonably
necessary for the use and enjoyment of the servitude.11 As for doctrinal attribution,
the court seems to have viewed the right as an implied term of the original grant of
servitude. Lord Neuberger indeed is explicit on this point,12 treating the rule as an
example of
a general and well established principle which applies to contracts, whether relating to
grants of land or other arrangements. That principle is that the law will imply a term into a
contract, where, in the light of the terms of the contract and the facts known to the parties
at the time of the contract, such a term would have been regarded as reasonably necessary
or obvious to the parties.
Although a natural approach to take, this was not, however, an inevitable one. The
fact that a right is “implied” does not require that it be implied as a term of a contract.
The law can also imply rights by way of freestanding rules. The difference matters. In
the context of accessory rights in servitudes, a freestanding rule asks what, today, is
reasonably necessary for the use and enjoyment of the servitude, whereas a rule tied
6 2004 SCLR 135, discussed in K G C Reid and G L Gretton, Conveyancing 2003 (2004) 68.
7 [2005] CSIH 14, 2005 SC 281, discussed in K G C Reid and G L Gretton, Conveyancing 2005 (2006)
93.
8 [2007] UKHL 42, 2007 SLT 989.
9 See D J Cusine and R R M Paisley, Servitudes and Rights of Way (1998) paras 12.124-12.127.
10 Namely that the right should be essential to the effective operation of the servitude: see paras 82, 86.
11 Para 110 per Lord Neuberger. In different words but to similar effect, Lord Hope said, at para 29,
that accessory rights were implied if they are “necessary for the convenient and comfortable use and
enjoyment of the servitude”.
12 Para 113.
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to implied terms asks “what the parties must, if they had thought about it, have had in
mind” as being reasonably necessary.13 The former is a rule rooted in legal policy, the
latter in the presumed intention of the parties at the time of the original grant.14 It is
not to be supposed that the House of Lords made a choice between these alternatives,
because there is no indication that the possibility of a freestanding rule was canvassed
in argument. Nevertheless, there is nothing surprising in the favour shown to an
implied terms analysis. It is consistent with the standard view of implied servitudes15
as an implied term of the disposition which effects the severance of one property
from another, and it is consistent too with what has been described in England as a
growing judicial tendency “to rest the right to an easement on supposed intention of
the parties to the contract”.16
Yet it is hard not to have misgivings about the result. Whatever its merits in the
field of contract law, where it is a familiar presence, the doctrine of implied terms
makes an awkward fit with the law of real rights. In the first place, servitudes, unlike
contracts, bind third parties and affect successors, both of whom may be remote from
the creation of the right. In the case of a servitude granted in, say, 1808, who is to say
what circumstances surrounded its creation or what the parties might or might not
have intended? And as matter of legal policy, why should it matter?
Secondly, a complicating factor, not present in contracts, is the principle that a
granter is not to derogate from his grant. Arguably, its effect must be to restrict
or exclude accessory rights in every case where the deed creating a servitude does
so by reservation rather than by grant; for non-derogation means that there can be
no “intention” to withhold rights from the grantee except by express words. As it
happens, the servitude in Moncrieff was the subject of an express grant. If, instead,
the servitude had been reserved from the 1973 disposition – if, in other words, it had
been constituted in favour of the granter of the deed and not the grantee – the result
of the case might have been different.
Thirdly, parties can only “intend” something which they can foresee – something
which, as Lord Hope put it, “may be considered to have been in contemplation at the
time of the grant, having regard to what the dominant proprietor might reasonably be
expected to do in the exercise of his right to convenient and comfortable use of the
property”.17 But if accessory rights are tied to the intention of the original parties – of
the parties of 1808 – they cannot readily encompass changes in the use of the property
or in the general neighbourhood, let alone changes in society and in technology. The
rights are historically determined.
13 Para 52 per Lord Scott. See also Lord Hope at para 30.
14 See Law Commission, Consultation Paper on Easements, Covenants and Profits à prendre (Law Com
No 186, 2008) para 4.133.
15 As opposed to implied terms of servitudes otherwise created.
16 J Gaunt and P Morgan,Gale on Easements, 17th edn (2002) para 3-120. And see also Law Commission,
Consultation Paper on Easements (n 14) para 4.123, where the passage from Gale is quoted.
17 Para 30.
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Finally, a theory built on the intention of the parties can only apply to servitudes
created by juridical act. The question of accessory rights for prescriptive servitudes
thus remains unexplained and unexplored.
Each of these difficulties would be avoided if the idea of an implied term were
replaced by a freestanding rule. The question would then become what is reasonably
necessary for the enjoyment of the servitude and not what the parties are thought to
have regarded as being necessary at the time when the servitude was first created. A
contemporary test would replace a historical one.
B. LAW FROM OVER THE BORDER
The rule for accessory rights introduced in Moncrieff has its origins in English
case law.18 After expounding that case law, Lord Neuberger sought to justify its
application to Scotland by an argument which would have been familiar to his
Victorian predecessors:19
It would be surprising if that were not the law in Scotland. It accords with good sense, and
it is a point on which one would not expect Scots and English law to differ. While some
aspects of the juridical nature, origin and incidents of servitudes in Scotland are different
from those of easements in England and Wales, there are many aspects of similarity . . .
Some will take issue with the way in which this thought is expressed, but the thought
itself seems broadly correct. The law of servitudes is indeed often close to the law of
easements, and there is much to be learned in Scotland from the much larger case
law generated in England.20 If the rule on accessory rights applied inMoncrieff is law
from over the border, as indeed is the law on implied servitudes as a whole,21 it is
none the worse for that. And if the rule is a poor one, as suggested above, it is a poor
rule for England as well. The objection concerns quality and not provenance.
Finally, it should be emphasised that, while the law of servitudes is similar to
the law of easements, it is by no means identical. For that reason among others
it might be expected that a judgment in a Scottish appeal would employ Scottish
legal terminology, make use of Scottish case law, and, except where a comparative
18 See in particular Jones v Pritchard [1908] 1 Ch 630; Pwllbach Colliery Co Ltd v Woodman [1915] AC
634. In the second of these cases, Lord Atkinson said (at 643): “From these authorities it is, I think,
clear that what must be implied is, not a grant of what is convenient, or what is usual, or what is common
in the district, or what is simply reasonable, but what is necessary for the use and enjoyment, in the way
contemplated by the parties, of the thing or right granted.”
19 Para 111. For those predecessors, see A Dewar Gibb, Law From Over the Border (1950) 57 ff; T B
Smith, British Justice: The Scottish Contribution (1961) 83-89. Dewar Gibb’s tart comment (57) is that
“The convenience of this device, so economical of inquiry, is obvious.”
20 Lord Neuberger’s views may be compared with those of Lord Hamilton in the Inner House, who said
(2005 SC 281 at para 79) that: “[A]lthough passing reference was made to certain authorities from
England, I have not found these cases of assistance in determining the content of Scots law or in
applying it to the circumstances of the case.”
21 Implied servitudes were introduced to Scotland by the decision of the House of Lords in Cochrane v
Ewart (1861) 4 Macq 117. This followed Pyer v Carter (1857) 1 H & N 916.
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point is being made, expound the law of Scotland. Unhappily, that expectation is not
sufficiently met in Lord Scott’s speech in Moncrieff.
Kenneth G C Reid
University of Edinburgh
EdinLR Vol 12 pp 459-463
DOI: 10.3366/E1364980908000723
Calling Up Trumps
Trouble is brewing on the Menie Estate. The scenic coastal area is the site of a
proposed billion-pound development by the American tycoon and golf enthusiast,
Donald Trump.1 Planning permission for Mr Trump’s development initially seemed
certain. However, on 29 November 2007 the Aberdeenshire Infrastructure Services
Committee (AISC), by the casting vote of its chairman, refused the application.
Aberdeenshire residents and councillors who supported the development were
voluble in their criticism. Mr Trump, in response, claimed Scotland was closed for
business and indicated that he would not be appealing the decision.
Enter the Scottish Government. Alex Salmond, the local MSP as well as the First
Minister, met with Mr Trump’s development team on 3 December, who then met
the Scottish Government’s Chief Planner Jim McKinnon on 4 December to discuss
options. Immediately following the meeting with Mr Trump’s team, Mr McKinnon
advised the Cabinet Secretary for Finance and Sustainable Growth, John Swinney,
that the application should be called in for his personal consideration as acting
Planning Minister.2 Mr Swinney duly did so.
The decision to call in the application has been the subject of inquiry by the
Local Government and Communities Committee (the Committee).3 Four meetings
heard evidence from, among others, Messrs Swinney, Salmond, McKinnon and
Mr Trump’s team. From the Committee minutes it is clear that the call-in was
made for two express reasons: first, that the proposed development raised issues
of importance which required scrutiny at a national level, and secondly, to restore
confidence and certainty to the planning system. Although not expressly recognised,
a third reason appears to be Mr Trump’s flat-out refusal to appeal the AISC’s decision.
The three reasons are discussed in turn.
1 For full details of the development, see www.trumpgolfscotland.com/html/frameset.html.
2 The Minister for Transport, Infrastructure and Climate Change, Stewart Stevenson, would ordinarily
have dealt with the application. Responsibility was handed to Mr Swinney because Mr Stevenson, as
MSP for a neighbouring constituency, could have had conflicting interests.
3 It has also been the subject of numerous freedom of information requests: see www.scotland.gov.uk/
Publications/1997/03/17133808/0.
